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The present study aims for a better understanding of how individuals’ behavior in
monetary price negotiations differs from their behavior in bartering situations. Two
contrasting hypotheses were derived from endowment theory and current negotiation
research to examine whether negotiators are more susceptible to anchoring in price
negotiations versus in bartering transactions. In addition, past research found that cues
of coldness enhance cognitive control and reduce anchoring effects. We attempted to
replicate these coldness findings for price anchors in a distributive negotiations scenario
and to illuminate the potential interplay of coldness priming with a price versus bartering
manipulation. Participants (N = 219) were recruited for a 2 × 2 between-subjects
negotiation experiment manipulating (1) monetary focus and (2) temperature priming.
Our data show a higher anchoring susceptibility in price negotiations than in bartering
transactions. Despite a successful priming manipulation check, coldness priming did
not affect participants’ anchoring susceptibility (nor interact with the price/bartering
manipulation). Our findings improve our theoretical understanding of how the focus
on negotiation resources frames economic transactions as either unidirectional or
bidirectional, and how this focus shapes parties’ susceptibility to the anchoring bias
and negotiation behavior. Implications for theory and practice are discussed.
Keywords: anchoring, loss aversion, resource framing, money, embodiment, temperature priming, bartering
INTRODUCTION
Venezuela currently faces one of the worst economic crisis in decades (Cerra, 2017). In times like
these, trust in a currency can drastically drop to the point of hyperinflation. As a consequence, in
Caracas – Venezuela’s capital – people have started to barter and trade their goods over Facebook,
Instagram and WhatsApp. A kilo of pasta is exchanged for a packet of diapers (Fishwick, 2016).
Money is not regarded as a reliable store of value anymore, therefore economic exchange occurs
via bartering. But how do the outcomes from bartering negotiations differ from typical deals
that involve money? The present research examines how economic behavior is affected by the
characteristics of resources around which an economic transaction can revolve (i.e., money in price
negotiation versus commodities in bartering).
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To elucidate this research question, we opted to focus
on a well-established, robust, and highly influential effect in
negotiations—the anchoring effect of first offers (see Klein
et al., 2014). First-offer anchors have been investigated in
multiple studies and have been shown to strongly impact
behavior and negotiation outcomes (Galinsky and Mussweiler,
2001; Loschelder et al., 2016). Here, we specifically aim to
explore how the focus on different resources – money versus
commodities – affect the potency of anchors in price negotiations
and bartering transactions, respectively. Interestingly, the current
literature yields two plausible but opposite hypotheses for
how monetary resources and commodity resources influence
economic decisions and negotiators’ anchoring susceptibility. On
one hand, negotiation research suggests that being in possession
of money typically leads to a predominant focus on one’s own
resource and could lead to a weaker anchoring effect in the price
negotiation (vs. bartering) because people are averse to spend
their own money (Neale et al., 1987; Appelt et al., 2009). On
the other hand, building on previous conceptualizations of the
endowment effect (Thaler, 1980; Kahneman et al., 1990), one
could predict that people possessing a tangible object (rather
than money) are more concession averse and would hence be
less susceptible to be anchored in bartering situations (vs. price
negotiation). To examine these competing predictions, we asked
participants to engage in either a price negotiation or a barter
transaction, allowing them to invest either their money or their
own tangible resource. Hereby, we did not manipulate the role
of the participants as either buyers or sellers, but instead sought
to directly compare the effects of anchoring susceptibility in
bartering versus price negotiation scenarios.
To investigate the psychological influence of monetary
resources in negotiations more closely, we also tried to shed light
on the relationship of physical coldness and money perception:
past research has established a link between money and coldness
perception. Here, we also examined the reversed link of coldness
priming on monetary perception (and a potential interaction
with our price negotiation vs. bartering manipulation; Reutner
et al., 2015). Since this relationship has up-to-date only been
found in non-economic situations, we tried to examine whether
this potential link is generalizable to economic transaction
scenarios, such as negotiations. Hereby, we sought to determine
the extent to which perceptions of coldness potentially interact
with the focus on money versus tangible goods. Before detailing
these manipulations and reporting our experimental study, we
will briefly review relevant research on first-offer anchoring,
money and the endowment effect, as well as work on coldness
and embodiment.
FIRST OFFERS AS ANCHORS
As a classic judgmental bias, anchoring constitutes the
assimilation of judgment to a relevant or irrelevant numeric
standard (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; Mussweiler and Strack,
2000a). Anchoring is considered a highly robust phenomenon
(Klein et al., 2014) as anchors provide orientation for judges’
decisions in situations of uncertainty. In negotiations, recipients
are anchored by the first offer and assimilate their counteroffer
to this numeric value. Ultimately, final agreement gravitates
toward the first-offer anchor and recipients often secure lower
individual profits than first moving senders (Loschelder et al.,
2014b, 2016). To account for the impact of anchoring on
negotiation, two influential mechanisms have found empirical
support: insufficient adjustment and selective accessibility. First,
negotiators mentally adjust their counteroffers away from a first-
offer anchor (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; Epley and Gilovich,
2001, 2004, 2006). In a negotiation, parties trade concessions
and eventually meet somewhere in the middle of first offer and
counteroffer. When a counteroffer is insufficiently adjusted,
final outcomes gravitate toward the anchor established through
the sender’s opening proposal (see Epley and Gilovich, 2004;
Loschelder et al., 2017). Second, anchors can render information
selectively more accessible that supports rather than refutes
an anchor value. For instance, negotiators would primarily
focus on information that is consistent with a first-offer anchor.
High anchors, such as a higher price for a car, activate positive
attributes (e.g., valuable equipment and low mileage), and this
anchor-consistent knowledge lends support to the anchor and
bolsters its potency (Mussweiler and Strack, 2000a,b). In sum,
abundant research has shown that first offers function as anchors
and attribute a bargaining advantage to the first-moving party:
an increasing anchor extremity leads recipients to insufficiently
adjust their counteroffers and activates knowledge supporting the
anchor. In light of the plethora of research supporting the robust
and dominant impact of first-offer anchors, the astute reader may
wonder how negotiators can counteract this first-offer anchoring
bias. In the present paper, we will examine both a relative focus
on money versus tangible resources and a coldness priming as
potential moderating factors for the ever-so-strong anchoring
impact.
MAGNIFICENT MONEY VS. PRECIOUS
PROPERTY?
Competing predictions can be derived from the literature
concerning whether anchoring susceptibility is more pronounced
in price negotiations (money for item) versus in bartering
negotiations (item for item).
Money Hypothesis
Many studies have emphasized the role of money as a
multifunctional or ‘all-purpose social resource’ that can be used
in exchange for many goods and is linked to numerous key
psychological processes. For instance, it has been shown that its
relevance is strong enough to compensate for human needs such
as self-esteem or self-sufficiency (Vohs et al., 2006; Zhang, 2009).
The psychological power of money clearly goes beyond its multi-
functionality as it has, for instance, been found to have drug-like
effects on people (Lea and Webley, 2006). In light of money’s
influential role in our society, it is not surprising that money
is often viewed as the central point of focus in negotiations.
Neale et al. (1987) have shown that parties in possession of
money feel more powerful and less obligated to close the deal
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than their counterparts. With this leverage, and focusing on
their own money, buyers have often been shown to attain better
outcomes in economic exchanges than sellers (Neale et al., 1987;
Trötschel et al., 2015a). Money’s dominant role in negotiation is,
at least in part, supported by its characteristic of being highly
divisible (Appelt et al., 2009). A large sum of money can be
easily divided into smaller elements. Concessions can be made
much more easily. Buyers can simply offer 350€ instead of only
320€ for a bike. It follows from this divisibility characteristic
that most negotiations are perceived as a price-negotiation rather
than a commodity negotiation (Trötschel et al., 2015b). When
no resource is accentuated through the framing of a negotiation
proposal (e.g., “offer x for y” versus “request y for x”; see Trötschel
et al., 2015b), the dominant role of the highly divisible resource
money makes both parties focus on the monetary resource.
Therefore, buyers seek to spend as little money as possible; sellers,
on the other hand, seek to maximize their profit. Buyers are
placed in a loss frame, sellers in a gain frame (Carmon and Ariely,
2001). Previous research has shown that parties acting in a loss
frame have a higher resistance to concede (Kahneman, 1992;
DeDreu et al., 1995). If a party has a high concession aversion
they are more likely to receive a higher outcome (DeDreu et al.,
1995). This is why buyers in price negotiations appear to often
receive the higher outcomes than sellers (McAlister et al., 1986).
It follows from this research that participants in possession of
money should be focused on losing their own resource and thus
should be more concession averse and less prone to be anchored
than participants in a bartering transaction (H1a).
Endowment Hypothesis
In contrast to this literature on money and the buyer-advantages
in negotiations (Trötschel et al., 2015a,b), the endowment
effect sheds a different light on buyer-seller interactions. The
endowment effect is the tendency for sellers to ascribe a higher
value to items they possess than buyers are willing to pay for it.
It has been examined numerous times in behavioral economic
research (Kahneman et al., 1990; Heffetz and List, 2014; Sprenger,
2015). In line with the prospect theory, the endowment effect can
be explained via a shift of reference points for sellers toward their
own commodity resource, thus emphasizing their own losses
more than their own potential gains (Kahneman and Tversky,
1979). Conversely, on the buyers’ side, the loss of their own
money will loom larger than the gain of an object they do not
possess. This has implications for economic exchanges as in the
case of negotiations. For instance, as shown by Majer et al. (2018),
the focus on one resource triggered by procedural framing –
for instance: “I offer my X for your Y” versus “I request your
Y for my X” – can lead to a lower anchor susceptibility in
negotiators. It follows from this literature and these findings that,
in an economic transaction, parties in possession of a commodity
may experience an endowment effect and thus should be more
concession averse and less prone to be anchored than participants
in a price negotiation (H1b).
In the present paper, we examined these two competing
predictions and we tested whether being in possession of money
reduced anchoring susceptibility when compared with being in
the possession of an item in a bartering negotiation (H1a vs.
H1b). To address this research question, we manipulated whether
actors in an economic exchange transaction would either barter
commodities or invest money. To avoid potential confounds,
both experimental conditions realized identical numeric values,
quantities, and ultimately an identically divisible resource (see
details below).
EMBODIMENT AND COLDNESS
PRIMING
Surprisingly little was known about the psychology of money,
so that it has been called “one of the most neglected topics in
the whole discipline of psychology” (Furnham and Argyle, 1998,
p.2). However, in the past two decades psychological research
has started to shed light on this under-investigated area (see
Vohs et al., 2006). An important insight from this research is
that money as a concept may be closely linked to feelings of
coldness (Reutner et al., 2015). This money and coldness link
led us to additionally examine the potential moderating impact
of coldness priming on negotiators’ anchoring susceptibility. As
first shown by Williams and Bargh (2008), temperature stimuli
can change behavior and influence interpersonal judgement. For
instance, people primed with coldness are more likely to choose
a gift for themselves than for others. Many subsequent studies
then focused on the connection of physical and social warmth,
and provided hints for its bi-directionality (IJzerman and Semin,
2009; Hu et al., 2016), while more recent studies have also taken
coldness (rather than warmth) into consideration (Nakamura
et al., 2014; Willemse et al., 2015; Zhong and Leonardelli, 2015).
The expressions ‘keeping it cool’ or ‘playing it cool’ are used in our
everyday life to express self-control and non-emotional behavior.
The adjective ‘cool’ to describe a person is not necessarily related
to social disconnection, but is in its core a description of a person
able to remain calm and controlled in the presence of emotional
or arousing circumstances. While warmth is linked to emotions,
everyday language links coldness metaphors to describe rational
behavior. In line with this observation, coldness-primes seem to
have a positive impact on cognitive self-control (Halali et al.,
2016). Sassenrath et al. (2013) recently found that physical
coldness enhances peoples’ perspective-taking performance: the
egocentric perspective was reduced when subjects were exposed
to cold temperature cues. However, it remains unanswered from
prior research whether such enhanced cognitive control through
primed coldness might also reduce the potency of (first-offer)
anchors. We propose that, if coldness priming does indeed
enhance cognitive control, it should lead to an overall better
adjustment away from anchors before the negotiation, resulting
in a reduced anchoring susceptibility (coldness main effect; H2).
In contrast to this coldness main effect, one can also derive
a moderation hypothesis from the literature. Reutner et al.
(2015) showed in their experiments that symbolic reminders of
money can cause a lower estimation of the room temperature,
thus establishing an explicit connection between money and
the warm/cold dimension. Past research has only shown the
unidirectional influence of money on sensations of (cold)
temperature. However, many other conceptual relationships that
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are grounded in embodied cognition appear to be bi-directional,
as for example social and physical warmth (Williams and Bargh,
2008; IJzerman et al., 2012). Therefore, based on the assumption
that the link of money and coldness might also be of such
bi-directional nature, we empirically tested the prediction that
physical coldness affects individuals’ perception of money (and
makes negotiators less willing to spend it). We hypothesized that
coldness priming would exacerbate the concession aversion in
monetary (vs. bartering) negotiations and thus further counteract
the anchoring impact of first offers, again resulting in a reduced
anchoring susceptibility (moderation hypothesis H3).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants and Study Design
A statistical power analysis to determine the necessary sample
size was conducted using G∗Power (Faul et al., 2007). Given
that the effect sizes found in the relevant literatures on (1)
procedural framing that examines different accentuations of
resources (average η2p = 0.25; Trötschel et al., 2015b), and on (2)
the money-coldness link (Reutner et al., 2015; η2p = 0.19) seemed
relatively large and potentially larger than the true population
effects, we opted for a more conservative effect size estimate
of η2p = 0.06 (d = 0.5)—a moderate effect according to Cohen’s
conventions. The power and alpha-error level were set to 1-
β = 0.90 and α = 0.05 (Bortz and Döring, 2006). To detect a
possible significance in an ANOVA for main and interaction
effects, G∗Power indicated a minimal sample size of 171
participants. Anticipating that not all participants would meet
the experimental standards and would have to be excluded based
on pre-defined exclusion criteria (e.g., reported knowledge of the
anchoring effect), data collection was terminated after all signed
up participants (N = 219) had participated in the study. We did
not examine any data prior to termination of data collection. The
final sample included 189 subjects (Mage = 23.08, SD = 4.55)
because the remaining participants indicated suspicion of the
priming manipulation (n = 14) or spent too much time between
the priming task and the negotiation (more than 60 s; n = 16).
Both of these criteria were defined prior to data collection.
A 2 × 2 factorial between-subjects design with temperature
priming (cold vs. warm) and resource focus (money vs.
commodity) was realized.
Experimental Manipulation
All participants were randomly assigned to an experimental
condition. Participants engaged in an economic transaction
framed as either a price negotiation (money focus) or a bartering
negotiation (commodity focus). Both conditions were realized
as a computer-simulated distributive transactions, in which
participants acquired a bike stand (either by investing money or
by bartering for it; details below).
Participants were primed with either cold or warm
temperature. In the cold priming group, participants were
asked to read a newspaper article on a marathon taking place
in an arctic setting (cold priming group) versus on a Spanish
vacation island (warm priming group). A similar, successful
priming of coldness has been conducted by Halali et al. (2016),
when they presented an experimental task in front of a wintery
landscape background to prime coldness. In addition to a similar
picture in the newspaper article, we reinforced this prime with
the use of pictorial language to describe the arctic or summery
scenery. This description was presented from a first-person point
of view from one of the marathon runners. Recent research
suggests stronger embodiment effects when stimuli are presented
from a first person perspective (Macrae et al., 2013). In line
with the moderation hypothesis outlined above, we reasoned
that a successful manipulation of the coldness priming would
result in different foci on the resources, with coldness-primed
subjects focusing more on their own resource (especially
their own money) than subjects exposed to warmth-related
stimuli.
In addition, we manipulated the negotiations to center around
money (price negotiation) versus the exchange of commodities
(bartering negotiation). In the money condition, participants
were instructed to invest their money (between 1€ and 440€),
whereas in the bartering condition, we deliberately refrained
from mentioning money but instructed participants to engage
in an exchange transaction trading their own resource (between
1 and 440 bike bells) for the bike stand. To ensure that
the characteristics of resources were equal and thus had no
unintended (numeric) influence on the negotiation outcome, the
two conditions – bartering resources and spending money –
were identical in objective value and bike bells were said to be
worth 1€ each. Importantly, divisibility for both conditions was
identical, allowing for concessions in full units (1–440) and profit
rates were also identical (participants were told that after the
negotiation all remaining items could be sold for 1€ each with
no additional costs). In other words, the monetary and non-
monetary conditions had the same properties, except from their
explicit nature of being money in a price negotiation versus a
commodity in a bartering negotiation.
Negotiation Task
Participants were presented with written instructions to the
following economic transaction scenario. Participants were asked
to imagine being the owner of a small bike-repair shop. In
both experimental conditions, they were to acquire a used work
stand for repairing bikes (i.e., a non-divisible commodity item)
from another bicycle store in town. In line with past research
(e.g., Galinsky and Mussweiler, 2001), the experiment provided
participants with uncertain information and a potential range in
which the value of the bike stand could fall. Participants in the
non-monetary bartering condition were additionally introduced
to the fact that their bicycle shop had bike bells in stock and
that the owner of the other bike shop had accepted to barter
bells for his stand. Hence, whereas in the price condition,
negotiators invested their own money for the bike stand (1€–
440€), participants in the bartering condition traded between 1
and 440 bike bells for the same stand.
Dependent Variables
As dependent variables, we measured participants’ first and
second counteroffer and their willingness to pay (WTP), as well
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as the concession range (difference between first counteroffer
and WTP). To check whether the coldness manipulation did
indeed result in a stronger focus on participants’ own resources,
we asked participants which resource they had predominantly
focused on during the economic transaction (1 = own resource to
7 = other’s resource). To illuminate the underlying psychological
mechanism, we assessed participants’ experienced concession
aversion (i.e., “I had a hard time making concessions toward
my negotiation opponent,” “I did not like to comply with the
seller with my money/commodity” [reverse coded]; r = 0.552,
p < 0.001).
Procedure
The transaction started with a first offer from participants’
(simulated) negotiation opponent. This first-offer anchor was
500€ or 500 bells, respectively. The anchor was set above the
highest possible price that the participants could afford to prevent
people from accepting the first request right away. All proposals
throughout the study were phrased as neutral as possible to
avoid unintentionally highlighting either of the resources (“The
seller starts with a suggestion of 500× in exchange for the bike-
stand; Trötschel et al., 2015b). Over two negotiation rounds
the concession aversion was measured (both counteroffers were
rejected by the opposing seller); participants were finally asked
to name their highest WTP (maximum number of € or bells
they were willing to invest for the bike stand). Subsequently,
participants were informed that their WTP had been accepted
by the seller and that the negotiation was closed. All participants
were debriefed and thanked for their participation.
RESULTS
Manipulation Check
Indicating a successful coldness priming manipulation and in line
with our predictions, participants in the cold condition reported a
stronger focus on their own resources (M = 2.67, SD = 1.36) than
participants exposed to warmth stimuli (M = 3.06, SD = 1.54),
t(187) = −1.90, p = 0.03, d = 0.28 (one-tailed). Even though the
effect-size turned out smaller than expected, it is consistent with
what has been reported in the literature (Steinmetz and Posten,
2017, Study 1b), and a successful manipulation can be assumed.
Anchoring Susceptibility
In line with the endowment hypothesis (H1b), participants in the
commodity condition were anchored less—they made lower, thus
more self-serving, counteroffers (M = 208.92, SD = 59.01) than
participants in the money condition (M = 227.58, SD = 59.17).
The two-factorial ANOVA for first counteroffer revealed a main
effect for resource F(1,185) = 4.70, p = 0.031, η2p = 0.025. Neither
the main effect for coldness priming (F[1,185] = 0.069, p = 0.793;
H2), nor the interaction effect of Coldness × Money Salience
were significant, F(1,185) = 1.74, p = 0.188. Hence, contrary to
the moderation hypothesis (H3), participants exposed to coldness
did not display a lower anchor susceptibility when negotiating
about money rather than bartering their commodities.
Negotiation Process
To assess possible differences between experimental conditions
over the course of the negotiation, we performed a 2 (Coldness
Prime) × 2 (Money Salience) × 3 (Negotiation Round)
ANOVA with repeated measures for the latter Round factor.
As expected, a main effect for Round occurred—all participants
conceded over the course of the negotiation, F(2,370) = 656.70,
p < 0.001 η2p = 0.78 (Figure 1). All interaction effects were
non-significant—both two-way (all Fs < 0.741, ps > 0.477),
and three-way (F = 1.31, p = 0.272). However, in line with the
endowment hypothesis, a strong main effect again emerged for
the money salience manipulation, F(1,185) = 8.63, p = 0.004,
η2p = 0.045 (H1b).
Across the negotiation rounds, participants in the bartering
negotiation were anchored less – made lower and more self-
serving proposals – than participants in the price condition
(Figure 1). In summary, the reduced anchor susceptibility in first
counteroffers was maintained over the negotiation process and
culminated in a lower WTP.
Robustness Check
The high power and the large sample size of the present
study allowed us to alleviate potential concerns about a type-
I error by conducting a robustness check that replicated the
reported main effects for money vs. bartering in two independent
subsamples. Specifically, we randomly generated two subsamples
of completely independent participants. For both of these
subsamples, we then re-ran the 2 (Coldness Prime) × 2 (Money
Salience) × 3 (Negotiation Round) ANOVA with repeated
measures for the latter Round factor. As expected, a significant
main effect emerged for Money Salience in both the first
subsample, F(1,89) = 7.38, p = 0.008, η2p = 0.076, and the second
subsample, F(1,92) = 4.86, p = 0.030, η2p = 0.05.
In short, both randomly generated subsamples independently
corroborate the analyses reported above and thus markedly
FIGURE 1 | Participants’ negotiation proposals as a function of negotiation
round and money salience. Participants in the bartering negotiation (gray
circles) were anchored less by the opponents’ first offer than participants in
the price negotiation (black squares). This initial difference for counteroffers
was maintained over the course of negotiations and culminated in a lower
willingness to pay (WTP) for the bartering compared to the money condition.
Error bars represent +/– 1 SEM.
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attenuate the likelihood of a type-I error to a total of 0.25% (i.e.,
0.05 ∗ 0.05 = 0.0025).
Underlying Mechanisms
We next examined how (1) participants’ self-reported concession
aversion correlated with their anchoring susceptibility, and (2)
how our coldness priming and money salience manipulations
affected this psychological mechanism. First, higher levels of
concession aversion were, as expected, correlated with lower
counteroffers (r = −0.258, p < 0.001) and a lower WTP
(r = −0.246, p < 0.001). Second, contrary to our predictions,
a 2 (Coldness Prime) × 2 (Money Salience) ANOVA showed
no systematic impact on participants’ concession aversion (all
Fs < 0.63, ps > 0.428). Accordingly, mediation analyses using
the Process macro (Hayes, 2017, model 4; Figure 2) did not show
that the direct effect of money salience (0 = price negotiation;
1 = bartering transaction) on first counteroffers [B = −19.67,
SE = 8.32, CI95%(−36.08; −3.26)] was mediated through an
indirect effect of self-reported concession aversion [B = 1.01,
SE = 2.35, CI95%(−3.31; 6.22)].
DISCUSSION
The present paper examined whether (1) temperature priming
and (2) an economic transaction framing (monetary versus
commodity focus) impact negotiators’ anchoring susceptibility
and ultimately their willingness to pay. We empirically examined
two competing predictions for the price versus bartering
manipulation, as well as a potential interaction of coldness
priming with a monetary focus. Our results are much in line
with the endowment hypothesis according to which parting
with one’s tangible items in a bartering negotiation leads to a
reduced anchoring susceptibility compared to investing one’s
money in a price negotiation. In other words, our results show
that participants who bartered their own resources were anchored
much less by the opponent’s first offer than participants who
invested money in a price negotiation. In fact, this pattern
unfolded over the entire course of the negotiation, during
which participants in possession of the commodity made lower
offers and ultimately showed a lower willingness to pay. As
illustrated in Figure 1, our results show that the interaction
of negotiation process and price/bartering conditions was non-
significant, which means that parties in the money and in the
commodity condition made equally large concessions from their
first counteroffer to their final WTP. Ultimately, this indicates
that – due to their lower first counteroffer – participants in the
commodity condition were not anchored as much as the ones in
the monetary condition.
Limitations and Future Research
More closely inspecting the nature of price negotiation versus
bartering transactions may shed novel light on the observed
outcome pattern, some limitations, and avenues for future
research. In our everyday lives, we use money in numerous
situations, as cold hard cash at the coffee place or as quick
digital payment at the gas station. Most of the time, we consider
these transactions as unidirectional: we do not necessarily frame
it as selling our money but rather see it as the purchase of
coffee or gasoline. In the situation of a barter deal, people may
perceive a highly similar (almost identical) transaction as more
bi-directional. Hence, the exchange of resources in a bartering
transaction is more symmetrical in that both negotiators part
with their own belonging and receive the others’ belonging
accordingly. Psychologically trading one’s good may subjectively
come at a greater cost—we feel concession averse to part with our
precious property. Ultimately, an elevated concession aversion in
a bartering transaction may lead to a lower anchoring potency of
the first offer in the commodity (than in the price) condition and
culminates in a lower WTP.
FIGURE 2 | Mediation analysis: the direct effect of money salience on first counteroffer was significant, the indirect effect through participants’ concession aversion
was not due to a non-significant a-path. Path coefficients are unstandardized regression weights for Z-scored mediator and dependent variable.
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The present data come with the limitation that asking
participants to self-report their concession aversion did not
show the expected, systematic difference between prices versus
bartering negotiations. This lack of systematic difference in self-
reports may well be due to a lack of introspective insight of
participants in terms of their perceived concession aversion,
likely because a sense of loss aversion is typically not something
that people are capable of observing in themselves, let alone
expressing verbally when asked about it (see Nisbett and
Bellows, 1977). Some of our own related work in this field
also indicates that concession aversion – as a construct –
is not introspectively accessible to our recruited participants
(Trötschel et al., 2015a). To overcome this shortcoming, future
research may additionally capture concession aversion and
loss aversion not via self-reports but via more unobtrusive,
direct measures—for instance, via participants’ electro-dermal
activity (EDA). EDA has been shown to be a rather sensitive
measure for participants’ impression of making monetary losses
(e.g., Bechara et al., 1997), even when participants are not
yet consciously aware of the impending losses. In the present
study we followed recent research on the anchoring effect
and treated a behavioral measure (anchoring susceptibility)
as a downstream consequence of an underlying psychological
process (loss aversion; see also Epley and Gilovich, 2001, 2006,
2010; Mussweiler and Strack, 2001, for similar approaches).
Note for instance, that the prominent perception is that
insufficient adjustment accounts for the anchoring effect (e.g.,
Epley and Gilovich, 2010), yet the adjustment process itself
is difficult to measure (introspectively); it has thus been
inferred from a stronger (vs. less pronounced) anchoring
effect. In this regard, the present study is unfortunately no
exception in that we did not find mediation evidence for
subjectively experienced concession aversion—in spite of clear
differences for anchoring susceptibility. As mentioned above,
follow-up studies could assess the underlying psychological
constructs (concession aversion, insufficient adjustment, etc.)
more elaborately (and potentially with indirect, physiological
measures), when comparing bartering and price negotiations. To
additionally enhance a more distinct and valid psychometrical
assessment of concession aversion, future research might
also include an additional, validated behavioral measurement
of concession aversion, such as an Ultimatum or Dictator
Game. Finally, another possible explanation for why no
difference in self-reported concession aversion occurred is that
the characteristics of the resources may not have affected
concession aversion in the negotiation process but solely
negotiators’ initial anchoring susceptibility. This explanation
is in line with the finding that the two groups made a
comparable amount of concessions during the course of the
negotiation; yet, at the same time, they attained significantly
different negotiation outcomes that were due to different initial
counteroffers.
In light of the present focus on negotiating buyers,
we wish to note that our study sought to compare how
anchoring susceptibility differs between bartering and price
negotiations, not how it differs between buyers and sellers.
Given that a number of studies have found highly comparable
anchoring effects for both buyers and sellers (e.g., Galinsky
and Mussweiler, 2001; Loschelder et al., 2014a, 2016), it
seems reasonable to assume that the present findings will
also extend to the seller role. In any case, we hope that our
findings provide motivation for future research to pay closer
attention to the extent to which negotiators’ loss aversion is
affected when characteristics of the seller’s resource change—
that is, when sellers receive either money or commodities in
equal value for their own resource. Following our current
findings, we would predict that due to higher anchoring
susceptibility the first mover advantage is stronger in monetary
negotiations.
Contrary to the temperature priming hypothesis and to
prior substantiations of the coldness effect, we did not find
evidence that coldness impacted participants’ economic decision-
making or their anchoring susceptibility. We were not able
to extend previous findings from Sassenrath et al. (2013)
to our application in first-offer anchoring. It appears that
coldness priming does not counteract anchoring effects or
interact with price versus bartering manipulations in economic
transaction. One might criticize that the coldness priming
was unsuccessful. However, our findings indicate a successful
manipulation of coldness priming in that, in line with our
expectations (and past research in this field), participants
in the cold condition focused more on their own resource
than participants in the warm condition (see IJzerman et al.,
2013). Nonetheless, the proposed interaction effect of coldness
and price/bartering did not show significance. Participants in
the cold/money condition did not adjust particularly farther
away from the anchor compared to participants in the other
three conditions. A post hoc power-analysis indicated that
our study had a 90.32% chance to detect a directional effect
of coldness priming that was at least d = 0.43 in size.
We used this d = 0.43 estimate based on a meta-analysis
of 322 meta-analyses in social psychology (Richard et al.,
2003). Admittedly, this estimate may be over-estimating the
true effect size within social psychology. Hence, for a small-
to-moderate effect size estimate of d = 0.35 (according to
common conventions by Cohen), our study sample still had a
77.4% chance of detecting an effect. It did not. Nonetheless,
we cannot rule out that an even smaller effect size (e.g.,
d = 0.20) could eventually become detectable with an even
larger sample size. For future research, it seems fair to point
out, however, that the necessary sample size to detect a small
population effect of d = 0.20 with an 80% power is N = 620
participants. This sample size unfortunately exceeds our present
resources and it also raises the question whether effects of
this (small) size would still be interesting and psychologically
meaningful.
Ultimately, there may be many reasons why we did not
replicate the effect of temperature priming. We cannot exclude
that the augmented presence of stimuli through symbols (oﬄine
embodiment) has lower effects on cognition than their actual
physical presence (online embodiment) (Niedenthal et al., 2005),
especially in social priming experiments where effects are volatile
and small (Lynott et al., 2014). In line with this argument, the
only study that has provided evidence for the link between
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coldness and money – to our knowledge – used real physical
stimuli such as hard cash money (Reutner et al., 2015); in
the present study, we used symbolic/virtual money and oﬄine
cold/warm manipulations. Future research may want to contrast
physical money and physical coldness perceptions with virtual
money and imagined coldness to further illuminate the effect
and the boundary conditions for the priming effectiveness.
Future research may also examine whether actively simulating
cold/warmth has a higher impact on participants anchoring
susceptibility and economic decision-making than priming these
visceral states (Steinmetz and Posten, 2017). For instance, instead
of merely reading a newspaper article on a marathon taking place
in a cold versus warm environment (priming), participants could
be asked to imagine themselves for 30 s in this environment
(simulation). Again, we can ascertain for the present data that,
despite a successful manipulation check and adequate power to
detect a population effect of small-to-moderate size, coldness
did not impact negotiators’ anchoring susceptibility in price or
bartering negotiations. However, our findings do not contradict
previous findings on the effects of temperature priming. Follow-
up studies might continue exploring the boundary conditions
of temperature priming in other study designs and economic
scenarios.
Concluding Remarks
The present paper contrasted how the framing of an economic
transaction as focusing on negotiators’ money versus commodity
impacts their susceptibility to be anchored by the opponent’s first
offer. Put simply, we contrasted the impact of magnificent money
with one’s precious property and, in line with the endowment
hypothesis, we found that first-offer anchors were less potent in
bartering transactions.
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